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This article examines the ways in which executive authority and media 
organisations categorise the spectacle of public violence and disaster, with 
particular reference to an event (the Germanwings crash in 2015) where large-
scale fatalities were purposely caused. On occasions when a perpetrator 
commits multiple killings (acting impersonally but with ‘malice aforethought’, 
and usually against civilian victims), the immediate question appears to be 
whether or not the incident should be classified as a terrorist attack.  
This is especially the case during periods when mass or individual assaults are 
prominent in the public domain. In addition, however, there is usually a period 
of time when there is either some doubt as to the ‘correct’ depiction of an 
event, or caution is exercised as a general principle.  
Although this hiatus reflects understandable concerns over the need to 
secure an accurate account, it is also, in part, generated by the problems 
inherent in the uses of unstable or contested definitions, which typify the 
family of terms that include both the act of terrorising individuals, groups and 
wider polities, and the supposedly political practice known as terrorism. This 
argument - that definitions of terrorist acts are both uncertain and flawed - is 
evident in the apparent refusal by some executive actors to consider certain 
types of incidents as terrorism per se.  
Again, it appears that it is not always the scale of violence or the intent 
to terrorise that qualifies the occurrence as ‘terrorist’ in nature, but the actual or 
supposed affiliation of the perpetrators with specific political/religious beliefs 
or organisations. This is a form of categorical myopia (a leftover from earlier 
discursive configurations of the ‘war on terror’, which Mythen and Walklate 
suggested was the waging of hostilities “against an abstract noun” (2006: 129)) 
and is beginning to create dissent among a number of experts, critical 
academics, and citizens. This dissatisfaction stems, in my opinion, from the 
feeling that executive authorities continue to downgrade the seriousness of 
particular incidents: since ‘terrorism’ is supposed to be the most ‘offensive’ 
form of mass killing, the suspicion is that large-scale murder that terrorises but 
does not qualify as ‘terrorist’ activity, is relegated to an inferior category that 
requires less attention and less material recompense. 
 
Categories and generic/particular events 
 
  In the current period, whenever a violent incident takes place - one that 
is initiated by a perpetrator determined to carry out spectacular murders of 
numerous individuals - one significant aspect of the news and its ‘agenda-
setting’ procedures, is the need to distinguish between occurrences that can, 
and those that cannot be ascribed to terrorism. The attempt to place a particular 
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assault in one category or the other might seem to be nothing more than the 
exercise of common sense, as in some cases the motive for an act is made so 
clearly apparent, that its attributes are difficult to deny. This is true, for 
instance, when responsibility for terrorist assaults has been claimed by the 
putative culprits, and subsequently verified by executive authority. In other 
examples, the event may appear to fall short of the essential characteristics that 
would qualify it for inclusion in the designated class. Taken as a whole, the 
process of reproducing an intelligible overview of any specific event depends 
on its assignation to recognisable categories, which seems easy enough when 
some aspect of the occasion makes it seem like a ‘natural’ fit.  
Behind, however, this apparently straightforward process lies an 
unspoken tension between two types of event, one described in academic 
literature as generic and another known as particular (Higginbotham, in 
Higginbotham et al, 2000: 50). In everyday, as well as in institutional practice, 
human beings look for patterns that can help make sense of, and narratavise, 
private and public occurrences, creating a tendency to sort events into a number 
of story types. van Dijk noted that “if we know or guess that an oncoming 
event is a story, we may activate our conventional knowledge about story 
schemata in our culture” (1988: 14). Higginbotham’s version of this insight is 
that “events enter semantic computation … as they are linguistically 
represented through thematic grids” (2000: 76).  
Although the analysis of complex texts now encompasses multi-modal 
approaches, marking a development from primarily linguistic models and 
allowing the finer interrogation of auditory/visual material, the substantive 
point remains: that the ready-made ‘typicality’ of any master category may be 
used to relegate some of the particular features of an incident to the 
background, particularly in instances where there is - as in this case - pressure 
to sort events into one of only two categories (‘terrorist related’ and ‘not 
terrorist related’). Before, however, this problematic issue is examined in more 
detail, we can begin with a typically ‘minor’ event, one for which (initially at 
least) only the simplest outline report was provided.  
 
Categories and authoritative speech 
 
 An anonymous article in a British news source related an incident that 
took place “in a Poundland store in Oxfordshire”, where “a customer … was 
stabbed to death” (Independent, 2015). After describing this apparently 
senseless attack, the article went on to note that “police say they are not 
treating it as terrorism” (2015, my emphasis). The way in which the police 
categorise an event can, of course, be controversial: the long history of cases 
where rape is ‘not treated’ as a serious sexual assault is a case in point. When 
police forces relegate a case to a less serious criminal division, or a specific 
individual to a lower level of priority, then this decision can affect the form of 
investigation that follows. However, as noted above, when violent events are 
reported in the news media, the response of authoritative public figures is cited 
as the primary source of explanatory intelligence.  
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This conforms to Bell’s 1991 observation about the dependence on 
journalists of the ‘facticity’ of executive speech, meaning that when an 
authoritative statement is made, the fact of its utterance requires the media to 
recognise its import. The problem, of course, is that the fact of speech should 
not be transformed into an assumption about the ‘truth’ of content. Although 
journalists may question the statements made by politicians, police officers, 
and counter-terrorism experts, their opinions are nonetheless reproduced as an 
initial guide to violent incidents.  
Accounts provided by other social actors are valued if, for example, they 
offer first hand evidence, if they emerge from the ranks of known or alleged 
perpetrators or, increasingly, if they are generated by those individuals who can 
offer an alternative and compelling interpretation of the ‘terrorist’ paradigm. In 
the example cited above, a decision has been taken which removes a 
‘terrifying’ incident from the realm of terrorism, and it is unlikely that an 
analyst would take issue with this outcome.  
The thesis offered here is not, however, that established media forms 
necessarily misrepresent violent events, nor that they merely convey the 
official definitions of these incidents. It is rather i) that “some of the factors 
that distort the representation of reality … are … premised upon everyday 
spontaneous cognitive and perceptual features and conceptions” (Lau, 2004: 
707), ii) that the default or routine positions offered by dominant political 
actors convey a set of narrow conventions that reveal the deleterious legacy of 
the ‘war on terror’, and iii) that executive authority takes advantage of 
established assumptions to make terrorism appear as a particular form of 
ideologically motivated violence (Price: 2010).  
According to the rhetorical utterances produced by political leaders, 
terrorism is committed on a large scale, by individual and/or collective ‘non-
state’ actors, or by the clandestine operatives of rival powers that choose illicit 
methods to damage the ostensibly legitimate social order of the victimised 
nation. Terrorism is never attributed to the aggressive acts produced by the 
state that the speaker serves or represents, the hostile activities of which are 
described in alternative terms, as a form of legal or in some cases 
‘extraordinary’ retribution, including acts of war and punitive raids.  
The most strident of these ideological distinctions, between the 
supposedly more exalted quality of deeds committed by a formal power, and 
the evil conduct of its non-state rivals, is therefore weakened by the rhetorical 
opposition between the practices of the ‘home’ nation, and the ostensibly 
nefarious behaviour of alien but nonetheless legitimate state entities. If bona 
fide states can conduct terrorist operations, then this opens the door to a 
modification of the master-category, which has the potential to undermine the 
ethical claims of executive authority as a whole.  
Overall, therefore, terrorism is given a specific ideological meaning, and 
is not represented simply as a technique that is available to social actors in 
general: armed insurgent groups are more likely to be labeled as exponents of 
terrorism than those ‘non-political’ individuals who are designated as 
psychologically unbalanced, while the association of state formations with 
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terrorism depends on their relative position as friends or enemies of the 
‘victimised’ polity. The suggestion that terrorism can only be attributed to 
social actors who are driven by particular motives, means that it appears almost 
as a creed or belief (Price, 2010: 23), excluding some examples of mass 
violence that might otherwise help the analyst understand a much broader 
phenomenon of social, economic and psychological discontent. 
 
The Germanwings crash: a sense of injustice  
 
Based on what has been said above, my contention is therefore i) that 
the working definition of (post-9/11) terrorism, circulated by the public 
authorities of ‘advanced’ states, emphasises certain political characteristics at 
the expense of other modes of interpretation, and ii) that the consequence of 
this established practice is the creation of dissent among a number of legal 
analysts, state functionaries, and the relatives of victims. My second example 
of news coverage is used in an attempt to demonstrate these two points.  
The Germanwings crash of 2015 was an event that - despite the scale 
and violence of the occasion - did not fit the standard definition of terrorism. A 
total of 149 people were killed when an aircraft was deliberately flown into a 
mountain range in the French Alps. Having locked the pilot out of the flight 
deck, the co-pilot, a troubled individual who had previously been treated for 
depression, set the auto-pilot to ensure that the aircraft would crash. An early 
report of 2015 noted, “Investigators ruled out terrorism early on, and their 
position did not change when it was revealed that they believed Andreas Lubitz 
had deliberately crashed the aircraft” (BBC news online). This development led 
one expert on air travel to identify “the excessive attention given to terrorism” 
at the expense of other threats (Calder, 27.3.15.). The fact that the cockpit door 
had been reinforced to make it more difficult for a hijacker to gain access, 
meant that the pilot, excluded from the flight deck, could not prevent Lubitz 
from carrying out his plan. 
The sense that this event revealed the existence of a categorical 
inconsistency, was matched by the objection to the practical errors that arose 
from, and further reinforced, a distorted policy regime. The inability to provide 
standard explanations for the actions of ‘disturbed’ individuals like Lubitz are 
among the shortcomings that are beginning to receive attention within 
professional circles. The psychological imbalance attributed to individual 
murderers, for example, has reinforced the analysis of the unaffiliated ‘lone 
wolf’ assailant. In one recent case, a radio journalist caused extreme disquiet 
when he described the man who killed Labour MP Jo Cox as “deeply disturbed 
[and] mentally ill”, and argued that it “muddie[d] the waters” to describe him 
as a terrorist: the British courts had established the sanity of the prepetrator, 
and had indeed found him guilty of terrorism (Sherwin, 6.3.17).  
Professional attention often dwells, therefore, on the shared ‘behavioural 
traits’ of the individuals who carry out these massacres. One analyst, John D. 
Cohen (formerly the counter-terrorism coordinator for the Department of 
Homeland Security, and now an academic) gave a newspaper interview in 
	
	 5	
which he argued that these perpetrators go through a series of stages, 
“gravitating to an ideological cause” and thence to “tactics once reserved for 
terrorist organisations” (Gumbel, 2015, my emphasis). The suggestion here is 
that mass shootings are not automatically regarded as terrorist activities: 
instead, a certain kind of anti-social behaviour is the primary definer, after 
which potential offenders rationalise and aggrandise their discontent by 
associating it with deviant political philosophies. At first sight, this is a 
reasonable approach, because the psychological motivations that are supposed 
to underpin the actions of some jihadist and far-Right terrorists are meant to 
include conditions such as social isolation, personal dysfunction, and feelings 
of persecution. The problem lies with the tendency to amplify the cases of 
anyone who has an apparent affiliation with ‘Islamist’ doctrine, while giving 
less attention to the adherents of fascism. Some critics have pointed out a 
dangerous imbalance since, according to the New American Foundation, 
“domestic anti-government militants and white supremacists have killed more 
Americans since 9/11 than those inspired by al-Qaida and similar groups” 
(Shane, 2015). 
My contention here is that there are many newsworthy incidents that 
might once have been treated as examples of pure criminality, without 
requiring further explanation. However, as suggested above, the ‘event’ of 
terrorism as a public phenomenon is discursively renewed through the 
discussion of successive incidents, requiring the formal intervention of 
authoritative social actors to draw attention to its salient features, and 
separating it from alternative explanations, that might otherwise help to adjust 
the impact of the dominant analytical perspective.  
A limited conception of terrorism (a form, noted above, of ‘categorical 
myopia’) has particular effects on the type and scale of state intervention, as 
well as on the process with which this article is most concerned: the 
relationship between events, their mediation, and the production of official 
rationales. As argued previously, the difficulty of providing reliable 
descriptions of people or events, as each incident unfolds, entails not only 
‘mistakes’ in classification, but can also be attributed to the enduring presence 
of flawed definitions of terrorism. In turn, the existence of these ambiguous 
templates seems to provide those in positions of authority with ready-made 
explanations that serve to protect their own interests, as distinct from those of 
the citizens they are supposed to represent.  
Narrow political definitions of terrorist activity or state intervention are 
only abandoned and replaced with new approaches when they prove counter-
productive for those in power (Price, 2010: 47), but the problem is that, to the 
relatives of those who have been deliberately terrorised and/or killed by mass 
murderers, current distinctions between forms of murder may seem offensive. 
As we have seen, the Germanwings crash of 2015 was not described as an act 
of terrorism, because it was not the consequence of belief-driven activities. 
Unless, however, the underlying flaws in ‘anti-terrorist’ policy and the 
inconsistent argument that states themselves do not commit acts of terror (or 
‘terrorise’ their opponents) are addressed, public disquiet will continue to 
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undermine the validity of the entire category, while seeking to extend it to 
those mass murderers and nations that currently seem to avoid the full weight 
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